To Know Your Enclave’s Runtime State? Just SMILE

主講人：Xuhua Ding

職務：Associate Professor of Computer Science at Singapore Management University

報告時間：2022年11月25日（周五）14:00

線下地點：2003网站太阳集团2003网站太阳集团3樓C312會議室

騰訊會議：568-115-346

入會鍊接：https://meeting.tencent.com/dm/8cOeq3qWVJJh

聯系人：崔津華

歡迎湖大師生、高校同行，線上線下交流！

個人簡介

Xuhua Ding is currently an Associate Professor of Computer Science at Singapore Management University. With around twenty years of research experience in cybersecurity, his work spans across system and software security, applied cryptography, privacy-preserving in outsourced databases. His recent research interest focuses on virtualization based secure and trustworthy systems on x86 and ARM platforms. He has over fifty publications in top tier security journals and conferences including S&P, CCS, USENIX Security and NDSS. He has served on the technical program committees in various international conferences in the past and was the program co-chair of AsiaCCS’22.

報告摘要

SGX enclaves prevent external software from accessing their memory. This feature conflicts with legitimate needs for enclave memory introspection, e.g., runtime stack collection on an enclave under a return-oriented-programming attack. In this talk, we present SMILE as a novel technology for enclave owners to acquire live enclave contents. Leveraging a semi-trusted agent running in x86 System Management Mode, SMILE authenticates the target enclave against a malicious kernel without using the SGX attestation facility. It preserves enclave security and allows a cloud server to provide the enclave introspection service. We have implemented a SMILE prototype and run various experiments to read enclave code, heap, stack and SSA frames. The total cost for introspecting one page is less than 300 microseconds.